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1.  Introduction 
“The most celebrated opponent of the sound symbolic hypothesis”, writes 
Magnus (2013: 201), “was, of course, Ferdinand de Saussure”. Of course. One 
of Saussure’s (1857–1913) key contributions to modern linguistics is the prin-
ciple of the arbitrariness of the link between sound and meaning, or more pre-
cisely between signifier and signified within the linguistic sign, his most de-
tailed discussion of which took place in his third course in general linguistics 
in 1910–1911. It was carried over into the posthumous Cours de linguistique 
générale (Saussure 1916), where it has been the target of attacks and the occa-
sion of apologies by linguists convinced of the explanatory power of sound 
symbolism, or iconicity. 
If Magnus presents a particularly strong version of the view that arbitrari-
ness rules out any possibility of iconicity in language, she is by no means alone 
in holding it. Ahlner & Zlatev (2010) and Wang (2010) are among recent pub-
lications that treat the two as being in direct opposition. Others, including Hut-
ton (1989) and Chien (2011), have argued on the contrary that the existence of 
linguistic iconicity is implicit in Saussure’s teaching, and Willems (2005) and 
_______________________ 
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De Cuypere (2008) believe that the published Cours underrepresents Saus-
sure’s interest in iconicity. Waugh (1994) finds some implicit recognition of 
iconicity in Saussure but nevertheless blames his doctrine of the arbitrariness 
of the sign for excluding iconicity from modern linguistic research in terms 
only a little less trenchant than Magnus’s. 
None of these investigations has however taken into account the last paper 
Saussure published during his lifetime (Saussure 1912), in which he mar-
shalled evidence for a very strong case of iconicity, where the shape of a sound 
is mimetic of the shape of the idea common to the words containing it (one of 
the rare later studies to discuss it is Gmür 1990: 47-49). To those who, like 
Magnus, understand iconicity to be the direct opposite of the arbitrariness that 
Saussure professed, it may look like a deathbed conversion, since he wrote this 
paper just after or even while giving the lectures on arbitrariness.
1
 Yet if we go 
back 35 years to his second published paper (Saussure 1877), it too proposed a 
form-meaning link, more conventional but still of the sort that typically gets 
classified as iconic. In between, we have his testimony from 1892 concerning 
his own synaesthetic associations of vowels with colours, textures and smells 
(see §6 below).  
This is starting to look like a very different man from the one of whose lim-
ited vision Magnus despairs. In this paper I shall offer evidence from these two 
papers of Saussure’s in support of a view of arbitrariness as not incompatible 
with iconicity, and shall explain how I think iconicity can best be understood 
and approached within Saussure’s theory of language. 
 
2. “Sur une classe de verbes latins en -eo” (1877) 
Saussure was 19 when his paper “On a class of Latin verbs in -eo” was read 
to the Société de Linguistique de Paris in 1877.
2
 It concerns verbs of the fourth 
class in Sanskrit, which form their present ‘theme’ from the ‘characteristic’ 
ending -ja. One would expect their Latin congeners likewise to belong to a sin-
gle verbal class, but in fact they are divided, some taking -io (capio, cupio), 
others -eo (torqueo, sedeo). Hermann Grassmann (1809–1877) had proposed 
that the choice depended on the length of the root syllable: if the root was 
short, the ending -io was taken, and if it was long, then -eo (Grassmann 1862: 
                                                          
1
 Since the volume was to be ready for presentation to Thomsen on his 70th birthday, 25 Janu-
ary 1912, chances are that Saussure was writing the paper no later than the semester in which 
the lectures on arbitrariness took place. For information concerning various details about Saus-
sure’s life referred to in this article see Joseph (2012). 
2
 The paper was read to the Société on 24 March 1877, in Saussure’s absence; so far as I can 
determine he had never yet been to Paris. 
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48-51). This worked in quite a number of cases, but Grassmann was forced to 
concede exceptions, including sĕdeo “I sit” — rather too many exceptions for 
his proposal to be convincing. 
Saussure approached the problem not just phonetically, as Grassmann had 
done, but via a combination of phonetics and semantics. 
Voici l’hypothèse d’où il faudrait partir: les verbes de la classe en -ja dont 
le sens était neutre avaient primitivement l’accent sur la caractéristique. 
Les verbes à sens actif de la même classe accentuaient soit la racine, soit 
la caractéristique, sans règle fixe. 
 Par verbes à sens neutre, nous entendons non-seulement les verbes in-
transitifs, mais encore ceux des verbes transitifs qui renferment une idée 
de passivité ou qui indiquent un état de l’âme; p. ex. patior, cupio.3 
This would result in two exceptionless rules: 
 1) all verbs of this class with a neutral meaning take the ending -io; 
 2) all verbs of this class that take the ending -eo have an active meaning. 
These two rules do not cover all the cases, because neither rule holds in re-
verse. That is, verbs which take -io may still have an active meaning, and verbs 
with an active meaning can take either -eo or -io, unpredictably. Still, Sau-
sure’s solution appears on its face to be superior to Grassmann’s by virtue of 
introducing a basic principle which Grassmann missed. And while Saussure 
does not claim to account for 100% of the cases, his solution holds in those 
cases to which it does apply. Admittedly, Grassmann’s solution was simpler, as 
it depended on length alone. But in the economy of linguistic explanations, the 
elegance of a principle must be balanced against the residue of exceptions it 
leaves, and here Grassmann’s solution did not measure up, to judge from the 
unwillingness of others to accept it. 
Besides explanatory economy, however, another ideology was in play here: 
the Neogrammarian principle of exceptionless phonetic laws. By appealing 
solely to syllable length, an aspect of sound, Grassmann aligned his solution 
with the Leipzig ideal. Saussure’s alternative implied that the meaning of a 
verb had a primary impact on its phonetic development. This looked from the 
Neogrammarian perspective like a retrograde step, since their whole defining 
project was to move away from the sort of explanation that operates on a word-
                                                          
3
 Saussure (1877: 280 [1922: 354]): “Here is the hypothesis from which one should begin: the 
verbs of the class in -ja whose meaning was neutral originally have the accent on the character-
istic. The verbs of the same class with an active meaning accentuated either the root or the 
characteristic, without a fixed rule. / By verbs of neutral meaning, we mean not only intransi-
tive verbs, but also those transitive verbs which contain an idea of passivity or which indicate a 
state of mind, e.g. patior ‘I suffer’, cupio ‘I desire’.” [My translation (JEJ), as are those that 
follow.] 
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by-word basis toward one in which sounds pursue a developmental path of 
their own, oblivious to the meanings and functions of the words in which they 
happen to occur. The data forced the Neogrammarians to admit exceptions, but 
they denied that these were ‘true’ exceptions and explained them by a psych-
logical cause, analogy. Only as a last resort were ad hoc causes admitted. 
What Saussure was proposing in this article both was ad hoc and directly 
invoked meaning. There is a grey area here. The classical languages had se-
prate morphological paradigms for active and passive forms of a transitive 
verb, for instance amat “he loves”, amatur “he is loved”. In a sense, this in-
volves meaning: more precisely, it implies that an aspect of meaning has been 
grammaticalized in the morphological system. One could say the same about 
tense and aspect: amabat “he was loving”, amavit “he has loved”. But gram-
marians have generally treated passivity, tense and aspect as morphological 
features, rather than semantic ones, especially in languages that have regular 
inflections for them — though also, by extension, in ones that do not. That re-
quires a bit of tap dancing when it comes to certain intransitive verbs, called 
‘deponent’, that always take the passive morphology, but do not have a mean-
ing which can be easily interpreted as passive, such as patior “I suffer” or lo-
quor “I speak”. 
This dissatisfying taxonomy was not arrived at without explanatory efforts 
that proved even less satisfactory. An account of patior as inherently passive 
was plausible: the words patior and passive are etymologically related, after 
all, and suffering usually has some external cause. But try to extend such an 
explanation to loquor, and you end up asserting or at least implying some ex-
ternal cause for whatever a person says — that I am not the agent of my own 
speaking, but somehow its patient. Some have interpreted Saussure’s late for-
mulation of langue in this way, generally in order to reject it; though I have 
met people who genuinely believe that everything we say and how we say it is 
predetermined, not even through social force but through some combination of 
genetics and external causation, so that there is ultimately no linguistic free 
will of the sort that Saussure located in parole. For such a person it would 
make perfect sense to say that loquor “I speak” is implicitly passive. But try 
this with the whole range of deponent verbs and your explanations will seem 
not just ad hoc but factitious, tautological, fantastic.  
The young Saussure is not saying anything obviously factitious in his 1877 
paper, but he is testing the limits. He proposes a group of verbs “indicating a 
state of mind” that includes patior and also cupio “I desire”, an active verb in 
Latin. Because this crosses the morphological boundary between active and 
passive/deponent, a linguist instinctively registers it as a semantic rather than a 
morphological category. But Saussure’s intention is to persuade us that, in the 
Iconicity in Saussure’s linguistic work  5 
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deep history of Indo-European, it actually is a morphological, which is to say a 
grammatical, category. It is marked in Sanskrit by the characteristic -ja, giving 
it plausibility as a grammatical category. In Latin, on the other hand, it has 
ceased to be clearly such a category, but neither has it entirely disappeared. Its 
reflex is — known? felt? — by speakers through the -io ending. What is the 
precise level of awareness here? Semi-known? Semi-felt? Unknowingly 
marked, or left as a historical trace? But if the mark or trace is perceptible only 
to a linguist, and not felt at any level by speakers, then for Saussure it is an 
‘abstraction’, an artefact of the linguist’s analysis that corresponds to nothing 
real in the language. The closest term for the sort of category Saussure is sug-
gesting may be cryptotype, Benjamin Lee Whorf’s (1897–1941) neologism of 
six decades later (Whorf 1956 [1937]: 71; see further Lee 1996: 176). 
For meaning to play a primary and regular role in the development of form 
challenges the Neogrammarian doctrine, and would seem to dilute the entire 
ancient heritage of teaching that the linguistic sign is arbitrary — that there is 
no direct linkage between sound and meaning in a word, other than the simple 
convention that binds them together as a sign.
4
 But at this point it behoves us to 
attend carefully to what Saussure said and did not say. Even in his third course 
in general linguistics, the source of most of the 20th-century doctrine of the 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, he devotes much attention to how arbitrari-
ness is limited within a language by systematicity and association. The exist-
ence of regular active and passive paradigms in the Latin verb means that the 
relationship between amat and amatur is not arbitrary in the sense of being 
random. Besides their shared stem, the endings -t and -tur relate these words to 
an entire associative series and, for a Latin speaker, to the meanings ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’. It is a strong association because of the large number of verbs 
that are part of the series, even though some of the most commonly used verbs, 
copulas and intransitives like come and go, do not take part in the series, nor do 
the deponents. 
Saussure’s posited cryptotypes aligning active and ‘neutral’ meaning with 
the endings -eo and -io suggest a weaker association, particularly because the 
cryptotypes apply in one direction only. He does not say that every Latin 
speaker had some awareness of the association. Indeed, the fact that no Latin 
grammarian ever thought to comment on it suggests in itself that, at most, it 
operated at a level which in his first course in general linguistics Saussure 
called ‘a demi-unconsciousness’ (see Joseph 2000b). 
 
                                                          
4
 On the history of linguistic arbitrariness see Joseph (2000a); and on iconicity, Jakobson 
(1965), De Cuypere (2008), Magnus (2013). 
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3. “Adjectifs indo-européens du type caecus ‘aveugle’” (1912) 
The 1877 paper concerns the diachronic development of the Indo-European 
languages, and does not directly address the question of speakers’ awareness. 
The same may be said of the paper from the other end of his career, “Indo-
European adjectives of the type caecus ‘blind’”, written for the Festschrift for 
Vilhelm Thomsen (1842–1927) of 1912. It opens with Saussure speaking of 
how 
Les diphtongues ai et au n’occupent qu’une place mal définie au sein de 
la morphologie ou du vocabulaire indo-européen. Entre autres faits qui 
contribuent à leur obscurité, elles ne figurent que dans une somme de 
mots extrêmement faible depuis l’origine […]. Pris individuellement, ces 
mots à leur tour ont très souvent une position isolée dans la langue, ne se 
rattachant ni à un verbe fort ni à une famille étymologique quelconque. Il 
est clair que ce dernier trait, pour autant qu’il confèrerait à ces mots un 
certain caractère de régularité, ne le fait que d’une manière tout extérieure 
et négative. (Saussure 1912: 202 [1922: 595])
5
 
Saussure’s contribution to this Festschrift was brief, roughly half the length of 
his articles honouring Jules Nicole (1842–1921) in 1905 and Louis Havet 
(1849–1925) in 1909. And it was daring, in that, for the first time since 1877, 
he was proposing that a particular set of sounds had a meaning or quasi-
meaning in Indo-European. The ‘type’ in question is a group of adjectives 
linked phonetically by having a diphthong that starts with /a/, and semantically 
by referring to some infirmity or deviation from the ‘right’ or ‘straight’. The 
diphthong could be /ai/ (as in Latin caecus “blind”) or /au/, but also /ar/, /al/, 
/an/ or /am/, all of which are analysed by Saussure, starting in his Mémoire 
(1879), as /a/ + sonant, hence as diphthongs in the same way that /a/ + /i/, or /a/ 
+ /u/, form diphthongs. Saussure does not mention here that few linguists had 
followed him in recognizing ar, al, an or am as diphthongs, though he knew it 
perfectly well and no longer taught his old doctrine to his students. Its appear-
ance here has the effect of transporting author and honoree back to the spring-
time of their careers. 
The iconicity here is of two sorts. Besides the sound symbolism of how the 
‘straight’ vowel /a/ ‘deviates’ off into the sonant, Saussure points out that 
                                                          
5
 “The diphthongs ai and au occupy only an ill-defined place within Indo-European morpholo-
gy or vocabulary. Among other facts which contribute to their obscurity, they have figured 
only in a group of words extremely weak since the origin […]. Taken individually, these words 
in turn very often have an isolated position in the language, being attached neither to a strong 
verb nor to any etymological family whatever. It is clear that this latter feature, to the degree 
that it would confer upon these words a certain sort of regularity, does so only in a wholly ex-
terior and negative way”.  
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words such as Latin blaesus “stammering”, claudus “limping”, calvus “bald”, 
mancus “maimed”, are very few in number and are isolated within the lan-
guage, being attached neither to any strong verb or to an etymological family. 
Normally, this would be a reason for not studying them at all. But Saussure 
maintains that their isolation and the rarity of the /a/ diphthongs they contain 
give them “a certain kind of regularity, though it does so only in a completely 
exterior and negative way”. The semantic link, on the other hand, is a positive 
bond. 
Coming so late in Saussure’s career, subsequent to the full working out of 
his idea of the axis of association (now generally known as the paradigmatic 
axis, following Hjelmslev), it is strange to find him contemplating the possibil-
ity that a group of words have a kind of regularity that derives from their lack 
of regularity, their isolation, lack of attachment to a family. Negative value is 
perfectly Saussurean, yet the hint here that certain forms might be related asso-
ciatively/paradigmatically, not by virtue of any link in sound or meaning but 
simply on account of being isolated within the system, is unique. It is this 
‘negative iconicity’ of their isolation that gives the group of words their sys-
tematic dimension; the ‘positive iconicity’ of the deviation from the straight is 
more immediately striking, but is not described in terms of regularity. 
It is tempting to wonder whether there is here a coded message to Thom-
sen, who along with Holger Pedersen (1867–1953) had sponsored Saussure’s 
honorary membership in the Royal Danish Academy in 1910. Both Thomsen 
and Saussure had been isolated within Indo-European linguistics, not being 
attached to a family as the German Neogrammarians were, but on the edges, in 
Copenhagen and Geneva. Both had reason to feel hard done by at the hands of 
the Neogrammarians (see Konow 1927: 932). And when Saussure moves on to 
describe the infirmity, the deviation from straightness, of the diphthongs, one 
thinks of Francis De Crue’s (1854–1928) comment about “son corps svelte, 
que sa dernière maladie finit par courber avant l’âge” (De Crue 1915 [1913]: 
21).
6
 Indeed, one of Saussure’s examples is Latin pandus, which he glosses as 
“courbé, voûté” (bent, stooping); and three of his Greek examples are ῥαιβός 
“courbe, cagneux” (bending, crooked), βλαισός “courbe, bancal” (bending, 
wobbly), γαμψός “courbe”. 
I shall not go any further out on a biographical limb than “It is tempting to 
wonder”, because Saussure’s ‘scientific’ publications all seem impersonal. 
Still, in his penultimate one, the 1909 contribution to Havet’s Festschrift, can it 
be accidental that Saussure alludes to so many core ideas from his early Mé-
moire (Saussure 1879), reviewed so positively by Havet (1879) in the Journal 
                                                          
6
 “[…] his svelte body, which his final illness left looking more hunched than his years”. 
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de Genève — including the theory of disyllabic roots, which Havet had been 
nearly alone in appreciating? 
The a diphthongs would be marked (to use a later terminology) for rarity 
and isolation, and being so marked they would correlate with meanings that 
likewise involve marginality or abnormality. It is through the regularity of this 
correlation that these apparently marginal elements are incorporated into the 
system where everything connects. But how does this happen? Saussure’s ex-
planation relies on another aspect of his general linguistic system, the relation-
ship of synchrony to diachrony. He imagines  
le temps où il n’existait peut-être que quatre ou cinq adjectifs ‘d’infirmité’ 
avec le vocalisme ai, au, an, etc. Autour de ce noyau fourni par le hasard 
seront venues se fixer des formations toujours plus nombreuses, où une 
certaine communauté de l’idée mettait en faveur les diphtongues par a. Il 
s’agirait donc d’un fait d’analogie lexicologique […]. (Saussure 1912: 
206 [1922: 599])
7
 
Note that he attributes the origin of this ‘nucleus’ not to iconicity, but to 
chance. Once the cryptotype was established, however, diphthongs with /a/ 
were ‘favoured’ for words sharing this general idea of infirmity. The favouring 
would presumably take place in the competition amongst innovative forms that 
occurs within parole. For Saussure, the key question in language change is not 
“Why are new forms introduced?”. In parole speakers are constantly introduc-
ing new forms, only a tiny proportion of which will find the social sanction 
that will make them part of langue (in a new état de langue). Rather, the ques-
tion is “Why are certain forms sanctioned and not others?” (see Saussure 1997 
[1908]: 47; Joseph 2010a). This is where the sort of analogy-driven favouring 
he refers to could make a difference. 
The associative relations that are central to Saussure’s conception of langue 
make it plausible that the analogy he proposes was synchronically real for 
speakers — for some speakers, that is: enough of them for it to have left a re-
coverable diachronic trace, but perhaps not enough of them for the set of /a/ 
diphthongs to form a morpheme, a meaningful unit in the langue that all 
speakers share. Linguists would be less hesitant to recognize it as a morpheme 
if it was a derivational suffix, rather than the root vowel. Saussure admits that 
this sort of unit  
                                                          
7
 “[…] a time when there existed perhaps only four or five adjectives of ‘infirmity’ with the 
diphthongs ai, au, an, etc. Around this nucleus furnished by chance, ever more numerous for-
mations will have come to fix themselves, where a certain community of ideas favoured diph-
thongs with a. It would thus involve a fact of lexical analogy […]”. 
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est dans le cas ordinaire suffixal (syntagmatique); il ne l’est pas dans le 
cas *kaikos, *laiwos etc. Cela fait une différence, même sérieuse, mais 
qui n’est pas une différence radicale atteignant le principe lui-même. 
(Saussure 1912: 206 [1922: 599])
8
  
And what is that principle? Most immediately, the ‘meaning’ of the Indo-
European /a/ diphthongs, but more generally the principle that languages con-
tain hidden form–meaning correlations that crystallize as speakers make ana-
logical links in their minds. Saussure had taught his students that the work of 
the linguist consists almost entirely of limiting what is arbitrary in language 
(see §5 below). His last published work provided an example of how to do it, 
in a diachronic context. 
 
4. Arbitrariness and iconicity 
If it is the case that the /a/ diphthongs had enough iconic force to leave a 
recoverable trace diachronically, without however forming a proper morpheme 
within the langue, then it becomes evident why we are dealing with something 
that is both iconic and arbitrary, without there being any conflict between the 
two. Latin caecus had the same meaning, or signified, “blind”, for those speak-
ers to whom the iconicity was ‘audible’ as for those to whom it was not. Syn-
chronically, whether or not a speaker is aware of these correlations, the signifi-
ers signify. That is the point of arbitrariness. It does not negate the potential 
force of iconicity in diachrony or in parole. Iconicity might well be part of 
what it is that leads a speech community to accept particular innovations rather 
than others. And yet, the sign still functions perfectly well as part of the lan-
guage for a speaker who does not interpret it iconically. Sound-meaning 
iconicity does not impact upon the fundamental arbitrariness of the linguistic 
sign. 
If this seems like an obvious point, it has not been treated as obvious. Dis-
cussions of iconicity have focussed on whether a word or form is iconic or not, 
an either/or choice.
9
 Rarely has the possibility been contemplated that it might 
                                                          
8
 “[…] is in the ordinary case suffixal (syntagmatic); it is not so in the case of *kaikos, *laiwos 
etc. This makes a difference, even a serious one, but not a radical difference striking at the 
principle itself”. 
9
 An exception is Willems (2005), which locates iconicity in the speaker’s ‘intention’, follow-
ing Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) view that semiosis is a necessarily intentional activity. 
This requires Willems to constuct a two-tier intentionality, with a lower level at which basic 
semiosis takes place following the principle of arbitrariness, plus a second, ‘higher-level’ in-
tention in which iconicity can occur. This has the virtue of moving iconicity out of the linguis-
tic sign, though with complications unnecessary to an interpretation of Saussure’s views, 
which I am trying to lay out in strictly Saussurean terms. Despite his relegating iconicity to a 
10  John E. Joseph 
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be iconic for some speakers or hearers but not for others — that its iconicity, in 
other words, might be a matter of interpretation. The best known considera-
tions of this matter are from Saussure’s older contemporary Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839–1914), who tried to circumscribe interpretation within the sign 
itself. The ‘interpretant’ he postulated is what is in the sign that causes it to be 
interpreted in a certain way.
10
 Despite (or maybe on account of) his maintain-
ing that “Of course, nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” (Peirce 
1931–1958 II, p. 308), and that interpretation must be by somebody, he desig-
nates that somebody as a “quasi-interpreter” (ibid., IV, p. 551; see also Petrilli 
2011: 79), in order to rescue signification from the threatening prospect that 
linguistic meaning might ultimately be indeterminate. Peirce is far from alone 
in suffering from what I have termed ‘hermeneiaphobia’, the fear of interpreta-
tion (Joseph 2010b), which is characteristic of linguistics broadly speaking.
11
 
Peirce wants the sign to be like God in William Cowper’s hymn God Moves in 
a Mysterious Way (1774), who “is His own interpreter / and He will make it 
plain”. 
The arbitrariness of the linguistic sign as discussed by Saussure is not about 
iconicity. What is arbitrary in the linguistic sign as Saussure conceived it is 
very specific: the link between signifier and signified. Each is a mental pattern 
or trace. The signifier is a sound pattern, the signified a ‘concept’, specifically 
a concept inseparably bound to a particular sound pattern. The sum total of my 
signifieds does not equal my ‘thought’. I am capable of thinking things for 
which my language does not have signifieds, and then having to push against 
its limits, as Saussure did when, in his lecture of 19 May 1911, he introduced 
the terms signifiant and signifié. 
The term iconicity is again due to Peirce (by way of Morris 1946: 191-
192), who divided signs into three types: icons, which signify what he called 
                                                                                                                                                         
secondary status, whereas I find no evidence of any such ordering in Saussure, Willems and I 
come ultimately to the same conclusion with regard to rejecting Magnus’s depiction of Saus-
sure as an “opponent of the sound symbolic hypothesis”. 
10
 Peirce’s fullest formulation is in a draft letter to Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912) dated 
24–28 December 1908, first published in Peirce (1931–1958 VIII, 342-376). As with so many 
aspects of his thought this is one which he revisited periodically throughout his life, with the 
result that any succinct formulation of it will be open to contradiction. 
11
 As exceptions I would count Antoine Culioli, and, weakly, Roy Harris (1931–2015), who 
preached a form of non-determinist communication that he failed to practise (see Joseph 2003); 
and beyond linguistics as usually defined, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), though not 
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), who is often read (or criticized without being read) as denying 
the existence of any fixed meaning when, on the contrary, his work not only depends on it but 
is largely devoted to investigating the many paradoxes it entails. 
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their ‘objects’ through some sort of resemblance or imitation; symbols, which 
signify their objects through purely arbitrary and conventional means; and in-
dices, which signify their objects through an actual, real connection between 
them. In each case the relationship is between the sign and an object-in-the-
world, precisely what Saussure declined to comment on. As a linguist, he con-
sidered himself qualified to pronounce on signs only. Any connection between 
signifieds and things-in-the-world were not, in his view, the business of lin-
guists, but of philosophers or psychologists. Peirce was a philosopher-
psychologist, who took the relationship of signs to their objects as his key 
problem. 
Had Saussure been aware of Peirce’s views, he would no doubt have found 
them very interesting. But not within linguistics; rather, within the broader se-
miology that Saussure projected but never developed. He could not do that and 
still remain true to his scruple of staying within his specialized field.
12
 
If we limit ourselves to the link between the mental pattern of a sound and 
the mental pattern of a concept, how could it be anything other than arbitrary? 
Concepts are not long or short, big or small. In the middle of the 19th century it 
was uncontroversial for John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) to assert that “all con-
sciousness is of difference” Mill (1867 [1865]: 62).13 So the idea that either the 
signifier or the signified is a value derived purely from difference was not radi-
cal, but well established in British psychology and philosophy — which did 
not mean that linguists, especially in continental Europe, were still aware of it 
in the early 20th century. 
Saussure made clear too that only the conjoined linguistic sign is real and 
concrete. The signifier or signified, on its own, is purely abstract. We can talk 
about them as we talk about the front or back of a sheet of paper, but we know 
that the only real, palpable thing is the whole sheet. Its ‘front’ and its ‘back’ 
are purely conceptual. Would it make sense to say that the front has an iconic 
or non-iconic relationship to the back? I do not think so. If you cut out a shape 
from the sheet, when you turn it round it will be the same if symmetrical, or the 
                                                          
12
 Linguistic signs as he conceives them fall within Peirce’s category of ‘symbols’. Over the 
last decade, ‘indexicality’, another term deriving from Peirce, has become a central concern in 
sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology (see Joseph 2013). Here what is indexed is not a 
word’s meaning in the usual sense, but information about the speaker, based on which those 
listening to the speaker construct an identity for him or her. These indices are geographical, 
social, sexual, generational, professional — the list goes on. 
13
 The quote from Mill actually expresses Sir William Hamilton’s (1766–1856) doctrine of the 
“relativity of human knowledge”, and although Mill is generally critical of Hamilton, he says 
that “With this doctrine I have no quarrel”. Joseph (forthcoming) traces this tradition of con-
sciousness-through-difference back to the associationism of David Hartley (1705–1757). 
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mirror image if asymmetrical; either way the relationship is an indexical one in 
Peirce’s terms. With the linguistic sign we do not even have the physical reali-
ty of a piece of paper, just two conjoined conceptual values-through-difference. 
To speak of an iconic relationship between them would be metaphorical at 
best. 
When discussing arbitrariness, Saussure brings up the usual objection to it 
— cases of onomatopoeia — in order to show that they do not in fact bear on 
the question. An onomatopoeia is a perceived relationship between the sonic 
realization of a signifier and some other sound, for example a sound made by 
the animals whose category is, in effect, the signified. So Chinese 喵 miao 
“meow” and even 猫 mao “cat” are onomatopoeic if one interprets them as 
iconic or, more accurately, indexical of the noise cats make (so too for English 
meow). Now, is that noise an inherent property of the signifieds cat and meow? 
Let’s say it is; it needs to be for onomatopoeia. But that concerns the relation-
ship between signifieds and things in the world, which Saussure made clear 
that he was not qualified to pronounce on, and is not what the arbitrariness of 
the sign is about. Onomatopoeia involves a link between, on the one hand, the 
sonic realization of a signifier and a sound-in-the-world, and on the other, a 
signified and that sound-in-the-world or the sound made by some thing-in-the-
world. In both cases, it means looking outward from the sign to the world.  
 
sounds-in-the-world       signifier — signified       things-in-the-world 
 
But within the sign, the link between signifier and signified operates identi-
cally regardless of what outward links may or may not exist. Such outward 
links are in any case a matter of interpretation, of opinion; and as Saussure 
pointed out, they are always mitigated by conventionality. Iconicity is in the 
eye or ear of the beholder; but what distinguishes a linguist from a semiotician 
is precisely that the linguist focuses on the centre of the linguistic sign, where 
the bond between signifier and signified is what Peirce called ‘symbolic’. 
The key, for Saussure, is that even with words like ‘meow’ where an iconic 
element seems evident, if cats were bred so as to make a different sound, the 
words meow, miao and mao would not cease to signify. They would still mean 
what they mean now, just because the link of signifier and signified is arbi-
trary. Even if some of us made up a new word for the sound made by this new 
breed of cat, and began introducing it into our speech, that would not change 
the language, unless and until the entire community of language users accepted 
it — at which point we would have a new language, in Saussure’s view. Even 
then we still could not be sure whether someone uttering the word, or hearing 
and understanding it, was experiencing it iconically or just conventionally. 
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To take one of Saussure’s own examples, there exist apparently mimetic 
signs, such as Latin pluit “it is raining”, in which it is claimed that the sound of 
a raindrop can be heard. This is a matter of interpretation. For someone who 
hears the raindrop in pluit, the mimetic link is real, despite the word’s going 
back to an earlier plovit, where onomatopoeia seems less plausible (Saussure 
and Constantin 2005 [1911]: 77).
14
 The Saussurean principle of arbitrariness 
holds that the linguistic sign operates in the same way whether there is such a 
link or not: the word pluit is no ‘truer’ for someone who hears the rain drop-
ping in it that it is for those like me who do not hear it; nor is it truer than a 
word such as rain in which any notion of a link between sound and idea seems 
far-fetched. It may well be that someone who hears the raindrop in pluit expe-
riences this word more intensely, more vividly (see Joseph forthcoming), but 
that is on the individual level of parole. 
 
5. Relative arbitrariness 
Nor does the link between signifier and signified figure centrally in what, 
in his lecture of 9 May 1911, Saussure referred to as ‘relative arbitrariness’. He 
began by saying that “Nous avons posé comme étant une vérité évidente que le 
lien du signe par rapport à l’idée représenté est radicalement arbitraire” (Saus-
sure and Constantin 2005 [1911]: 230).
15
 Of course, it was not ‘evident’ to his 
students, nor to others who had not shared his boyhood education by old Gene-
vese men who were still teaching the grammaire générale tradition. But it is 
not as though Saussure had never thought his way through that tradition and 
beyond. Much of the rest of the course explores how “Une partie seulement des 
signes dans toute langue seront radicalement arbitraires. Chez d’autres 
<signes> intervient un phénomène au nom duquel on peut distinguer un degré. 
[…] Il arrive que le lien entre le signe et la sonorité est relativement motivé” 
(ibid.).
16
 
His first example of a motivated sign is French dix-neuf “19”, versus vingt 
‘20’. Vingt is perfectly unmotivated — nothing in the acoustic image connects 
                                                          
14
 The editors of the posthumous Saussure (1916) replaced this with the French examples glas 
“knell” and fouet “whip” (Saussure 1922 [1916]: 102). The case of fouet had been discussed in 
Egger (1881: 248), a book Saussure is known to have studied (Joseph 2012: 288-291). On Der-
rida’s (1974: 106 b i) treatment of the glas and fouet examples see Joseph, Love & Taylor 
(2001: 198); Culler (2003). 
15
 “We have posited as a self-evident truth that the link of the sign in relation to the idea repre-
sented is radically arbitrary”. 
16
 “Only a part of the signs in every language will be radically arbitrary. In the case of other 
<signs>, we encounter a phenomenon which makes it possible to distinguish degrees. [...] It 
can happen that the <link between the> sign and the sonority is relatively motivated”. 
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in any way with the concept. But this is less true of dix-neuf, since it evokes the 
terms which compose it: dix “10” and neuf  “9”. Similarly, poirier “pear tree” 
recalls the simple word poire “pear”, while its suffix –ier brings to mind ce-
risier “cherry tree”, pommier “apple tree”, and so on.  
Saussure contrasts pairs of words in which one is arbitrary, the other rela-
tively motivated: whereas berger “shepherd” is unmotivated, vacher “cow-
herd” contains vache “cow”.17 The English plural ships recalls through its for-
mation the whole series flags, birds, books etc., whereas men, sheep recall 
nothing. The lecture concludes with a statement that seems paradoxical coming 
from the man who established arbitrariness as a principle of modern linguis-
tics: 
Tout ce qui fait d’une langue un système <ou un organisme> demande 
d’être abordé sous ce point de vue, où on ne l’aborde guère en général: 
<comme> une limitation de l’arbitraire par rapport à l’idée. Implicitement 
on s’appuiera ainsi sur la meilleure base possible, puisque la donnée fon-
damentale du signe linguistique, c’est l’arbitraire. (Saussure and Constan-
tin 2005 [1911]: 232)
18
 
In the lecture of 12 May he says that “Toute langue contient parallèlement mê-
lés en proportions diverses les deux éléments: le parfaitement immotivé et le 
relativement motivé” (ibid.),19 adding that (p. 234): 
En effet, on peut distinguer comme deux pôles contraires, comme deux 
courants antinomiques entre eux régnant en toutes langues, la tendance à 
employer l’instrument lexicologique ou la tendance à employer 
l’instrument grammatical. […] Le type de l’ultralexicologique est par ex-
emple dans le chinois, le type de l’ultragrammatical: indo-européen prim-
itif, sanscrit, grec.20 
                                                          
17
 Although unrelated to mouton “sheep”, berger is related historically to brebis “ewe” — but 
few French speakers are aware of this. 
18
 “Everything that makes a system <or an organism> of a language demands to be addressed 
under this viewpoint, from which it is in general hardly ever addressed: <as a> limitation of 
arbitrariness in relation to the idea. Implicitly then the best possible basis will be relied on, 
since the fundamental given for the linguistic sign is its arbitrariness.” 
19
 “Every language contains, mixed in parallel in diverse proportions, the two elements: the 
perfectly unmotivated and the relatively motivated”. 
20
 “In effect, one can distinguish as two opposite poles, as two antinomically opposed currents 
reigning in all languages, the tendency to employ the lexicological instrument and the tendency 
to employ the grammatical instrument. […] The stereotype of the ultra-lexicological is for ex-
ample in Chinese, the ultra-grammatical stereotype: primitive Indo-European, Sanskrit, 
Greek”. 
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Saussure now brings up the point that what he is calling relative arbitrariness 
has to do with the relation between signs. It does not affect the radical arbitrar-
iness within the sign, between an acoustic image and its associated concept.  
 
 dix-neuf dix             vingt 
  
      19               10           20 
 
And yet, everything comes down to the relation within the sign: “C’est la seule 
qui soit à considérer” (p. 235).21 He acknowledges that “Cela ne frappe pas du 
tout au premier moment”, but insists that “Nous <ne> pourrions <jamais> 
concevoir la relation d’un mot à l’autre sans concevoir la relation <intérieure> 
pour chaque mot entre le concept et l’image acoustique” (p. 236).22 
 
6. Saussure’s synaesthesia 
Finally, as I mentioned at the outset, Saussure’s denial of iconicity is fur-
ther thrown into question by his responses in May 1892 to Théodore 
Flournoy’s (1854–1920) questionnaire about ‘photism’ or ‘coloured hearing’, 
associations between sounds and colours. I shall cite the first two paragraphs of 
what Saussure wrote: 
Nous écrivons en français la même voyelle de quatre manières diffé-
rentes dans terrain, plein, matin, chien. Or quand cette voyelle est écrite 
ain, je la vois jaune pâle comme une brique mal cuite au four; quand elle 
est écrite ein, elle me fait l’effet d’un réseau de veines violacées; quand 
elle est écrite in, je ne sais plus du tout quelle sensation de couleur elle 
évoque dans mon esprit, et suis disposé à croire qu’elle n’en évoque 
aucune; enfin si elle s’écrit en (ce qui n’arrive qu’après un i précédent), 
l’ensemble du groupe ien me rappelle assez un enchevêtrement de cordes 
de chanvre encore fraîches, n’ayant pas encore pris la teinte blanchâtre de 
la corde usée. 
Ce n’est donc pas, semble-t-il, la voyelle comme telle, c’est-à-dire 
telle qu’elle existe pour l’oreille, qui appelle une certaine sensation 
visuelle correspondante. D’un autre côté, ce n’est pas non plus la vue 
d’une certaine lettre ou d’un certain groupe de lettres qui appelle cette 
sensation. Mais c’est la voyelle en tant que contenue dans cette expression 
graphique, c’est l’être imaginaire que forme cette première association 
d’idées, qui, par une autre association, m’apparaît comme doué d’une cer-
                                                          
21
 “This is the only one to consider”. 
22
 “This does not strike one at all at first glance […] We could <never> conceive the relation-
ship of one word to the other without conceiving the <inner> relationship for each word be-
tween the concept and the +acoustic image”. 
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taine consistance et d’une certaine couleur, quelquefois aussi d’une cer-
taine forme et d’une certaine odeur.23 
He goes on to give still further detail, pointing out that his associations are less 
strong with regard to languages other than French. It is surprising that it is with 
sound-letter combinations that he has associations, given his strongly worded 
views in the first course on general linguistics about the illusions to which 
writing gives rise. But he leaves no room for doubt about the reality and the 
regularity of these associations — for him. He is under no illusion that his as-
sociations are shared by others. The associationism that was dominant in 
French-language psychology at the time was based on how an individual’s first 
experiences of some sensory perception was linked to the surrounding context 
in which it took place.
24
 Associations such as Saussure’s differed in kind from 
the conjunctions of signifier and signified that constitute a language, because a 
language is, as Saussure repeatedly stated, a ‘social fact’. A language has an 
‘axis of association’, but it has been conventionalized and socially shared. 
Synaesthetic associations have not been conventionalized or socially shared, 
and that includes iconic relationships such as the one Saussure posited for the 
Indo-European /a/ diphthongs in his 1912 article. 
So he experienced ain as pale yellow; someone else might experience it in 
the same way, but most people do not, as Flournoy’s results showed, in case 
there was any doubt. And yet, all these French speakers were perfectly capable 
of understanding pain or main. Saussure himself did not understand pain better 
than main on account of the signified of pain corresponding iconically to the 
                                                          
23
 Response to Flournoy’s questionnaire by ‘an eminent linguist Mr X’ (identified as Saussure 
by Cifali 1983 from the original notes of Flournoy’s research assistant Édouard Claparède 
[1873–1940]), quoted in Flournoy (1893: 50-52): “In French we write the same vowel four 
different ways in terrain, plein, matin, chien. Now when this vowel is written ain, I see it in 
pale yellow like an incompletely baked brick; when it is written ein, it strikes me as a network 
of purplish veins; when it is written in, I no longer know at all what colour sensation it evokes 
in my mind, and am disposed to believe that it doesn’t evoke any; finally if it is written en 
(which only happens after a preceding i), the whole of the group ien recalls for me a tangle of 
hemp ropes that are still fresh, not having yet taken on the off-white tint of used rope. So it 
doesn’t seem to be the vowel as such – as it exists for the ear, that is – that calls forth a certain 
corresponding visual sensation. On the other hand, neither is it seeing a certain letter or group 
of letters that calls forth this sensation. Rather it is the vowel as it is contained in this written 
expression, it is the imaginary being formed by this first association of ideas which, through 
another association, appears to me as endowed with a certain consistency and a certain colour, 
sometimes also a certain shape and a certain smell.”  
24
 This again harks back to the associationism of Hartley (1747, Sec. 2, §18; see Joseph forth-
coming), transmitted principally via the works of Alexander Bain (1818–1903) to become an 
important principle of French-language psychology in the last third of the 19th century. 
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colour he associated with ain, whereas the signified of main does not. There is 
mimesis and iconicity for him — not for the sign. Qua sign, pain, like every 
linguistic sign, signifies through the arbitrary bond between signifier and signi-
fied, regardless of what iconicity may overlay it for one, or some, or many 
speakers. Or indeed for all of them, since tomorrow some child may learn the 
sign without the iconicity, and who will know that this is the case, so long as 
the child uses the sign appropriately?  
There is no contradiction. Iconic associations are of much interest to psy-
chologists and semioticians, as well as to poets and readers of poetry. But 
Saussure considered himself a linguist or ‘grammarian’, and the grammarian’s 
domain is the linguistic sign. Linguistic signs function regardless of iconic as-
sociations — which, however, may be useful in answering the cardinal ques-
tion of diachronic linguistics: Why, amongst all the innovative forms intro-
duced by speakers into parole, are certain ones and not others socially sanc-
tioned so as to become part of the next état de langue? 
 
7. Conclusion 
My campaign against hermeneiaphobia is not waged in aid of free interpre-
tation of texts. There are richer and poorer, more and less coherent interpreta-
tions, ones that square better and worse with the documentary record, which 
makes for complex work by readers who are quite the opposite of Peirce’s 
‘quasi-interpreters’. Saussure has been interpreted as leading the struggle to do 
away with diachronic linguistics, as working to undermine his model of the 
linguistic sign with his research into anagrams, and as having devised a theory 
of communication. Recently I read that he “presupposes that word meaning is a 
single monolithic thing — the word’s referent” (Magnus 2013: 202), and that 
“Saussure (1916: 115-116) regarded linguistic change as affecting single units 
only, which means that diachronic linguistics, unlike synchronic linguistics, 
cannot be a systematic or structure-based discipline” (Itkonen 2013: 763). And 
I have heard a senior sociolinguist matter-of-factly oppose the arbitrariness of 
linguistic signs to the existence of language universals.
25
 Far from being op-
posed to universals, it actually is one, as Saussure formulated it. It would be a 
forlorn hope to imagine ever doing away with weak interpretations of Saussure 
                                                          
25
 John R. Rickford, paper to the Edinburgh Linguistic Circle, 12 Sep. 2013, where Rickford 
reported this point as arising in the course of email discussion between himself and William 
Labov concerning Labov’s controversial (to sociolinguists) belief in the separability of linguis-
tic and sociolinguistic factors. As I pointed out in the discussion after the paper, this separabil-
ity, as Labov and Rickford treat it, is a reaffirmation of the Saussurean distinction between 
langue and parole. 
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or attribution to him of ideas contrary to what he said and wrote. Those who 
take Saussure to deny the possibility of iconicity are labouring under a compa-
rable misinterpretation.  
Saussure taught that one of the first distinctions to be made is between 
what a language is and how it is used, and that this distinction rests on the dif-
ference between what is a socially shared system of pure values on the one 
hand, and what an individual does with the system on the other. His interests in 
poetry, anagrams, legends, symbolism and his own synaesthesia were all about 
the latter — all, in other words, located within parole. Such effects as any of 
them might have on langue would be indirect, shaping a future état de langue 
just as other aspects of parole may do.  
Where iconicity was concerned, he was similarly interested — not a denier. 
As a matter of individual rather than social interpretation and use, iconicity po-
tentially affects a future état de langue, without attenuating the arbitrariness of 
the link between signifier and signified that he identified as the first principle 
of the linguistic sign. 
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SUMMARY 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) is routinely criticized for denying the 
possibility of iconicity in language through his principle of the arbitrariness of 
linguistic signs. Yet two of his articles, one from the beginning (1877) and the 
other from the end (1912) of his career, propose analyses of the development 
of certain Latin verbs and adjectives in which iconicity plays a key role. Saus-
sure did not dismiss iconicity, but limited its sphere of application to the rela-
tionship between signs and their referents, which falls outside linguistics as he 
defined it. Hence iconicity does not contradict arbitrariness, which applies to 
the relationship between signifier and signified within the linguistic sign. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) est fréquemment la cible de critiques 
selon lesquelles son principe de l’arbitraire du signe aurait nié la possibilité de 
l’iconicité dans le langage. Toutefois, deux de ses articles, l’un du début 
(1877), l’autre de la fin (1912) de sa carrière, proposent des analyses du dé-
veloppement de certains verbes et adjectifs latins où l’iconicité aurait joué un 
rôle important. Saussure ne rejeta pas l’iconicité, mais limita son champ 
d’application au lien entre les signes et leurs référents, un lien qui se situe en 
dehors de la linguistique telle qu’il la définit. Donc l’iconicité ne contredit pas 
l’arbitraire, qui s’applique spécifiquement au lien entre le signifiant et le sig-
nifié à l’intérieur du signe linguistique. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) wird oftmals kritisiert, weil er die 
Möglichkeit der Ikonizität der Sprache in Abrede stelle dadurch, dass er auf 
dem Prinzip der Arbitrarität des sprachlichen Zeichens beharre. Jedoch in zwei 
Aufsätzen, einem vom Beginn (1877) und einem am Ende seiner Laufbahn 
(1912), schlägt er Analysen in der Entwicklung  gewisser lateinischer Verben  
und Adjektive vor, in denen die Ikonizität eine zentrale Rolle spielen. Saussure 
verneinte die Ikonizität der Sprache nicht grundsätzlich, begrenzte jedoch 
deren Gebrauch zum Verhältnis zwischen Zeichen und deren Referenten, das 
er jedoch als außerhalb der Sprachwissenschaft wie er sie definierte, 
Iconicity in Saussure’s linguistic work  23 
_____________________________________________________________________  
 
 
betrachtete. Daher widersprach die Ikonizität nicht der Arbitrarität des spra-
chlichen Zeichens, die sich auf das Verhältnis zwischen signifiant und signifié 
innerhalb des sprachlichen Zeichens bezieht. 
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